



Nuclear Posture Review

April 6, 2010

2010 NPR in Context

- **Third comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear policies and posture**
 - Previous reviews in 1994 and 2001
- **Conducted by DoD in close consultation with the Departments of State and Energy**
- **Builds on QDR and BMDR (released Feb. 1, 2010)**
- **Close consultation with Congress and allies throughout**

Roadmap for implementing the President's agenda for reducing nuclear dangers

Adapting to a Changed Security Environment

- **Focus on most urgent dangers: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism**
 - Transnational terrorist groups seeking to acquire and use nuclear weapons
 - States pursuing nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community
- **Enhance regional security architectures to strengthen deterrence of regional aggression and reassure allies and partners of U.S. commitment to their defense**
- **Reinforce strategic stability with Russia and China**
 - U.S. and Russia still have more nuclear weapons than needed for stable deterrence

“Put an end to Cold War thinking”

NPR Policy Framework

- 1. Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism**
- 2. Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons**
- 3. Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels**
- 4. Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring U.S. Allies and Partners**
- 5. Sustaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Arsenal**

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism – Key Initiatives

- **Lead international efforts to bolster nuclear non-proliferation regime**
 - Strengthen IAEA safeguards and enforce compliance
 - Increase DOE non-proliferation programs by 25 percent (to \$2.7 billion)
- **Accelerate efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years**
 - Enhance capabilities to detect and interdict smuggled nuclear materials
- **Reaffirm U.S. commitment to fulfill NPT obligations including Article VI**
 - New START, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
 - Comprehensive national R&D program on verification
- **Renew U.S. commitment: to “hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use WMD”**

Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons

U.S. Declaratory Policy

For Non-Nuclear Weapons States Compliant with Non-Proliferation Obligations:

- Strengthen the U.S. “negative security assurance”
 - “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations”
 - These states face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response if use CBW against the United States or its allies and partners
 - If biological threat grows, U.S. reserves right to adjust assurance

For Nuclear Weapons States and Non-Compliant States:

- The U.S. would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, our allies and partners
- For these states, there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring conventional or CBW attack

As long as nuclear weapons exist

- The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners
- Continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the **sole purpose** of U.S. nuclear weapons

Maintaining Strategic Deterrence and Stability at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels

- **New START: An essential next step**
 - Treaty Limits
 - 1,550 accountable strategic warheads (30 percent lower than SORT)
 - 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles
 - 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers (50 percent lower than START I)
 - Retain nuclear Triad under New START
 - “De-Mirv” ICBMs to one warhead each to enhance crisis stability
 - Does not constrain U.S. missile defenses or long-range conventional strike capabilities
- **Make new investments in the U.S. command and control system to maximize Presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis**
- **Seek high-level dialogues with Russia and China to promote more stable and transparent strategic relationships**

Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassurance of U.S. Allies and Partners

- **U.S. committed to working with allies and partners to strengthen regional deterrence**
 - Continue to enhance conventional capabilities, field regional missile defenses, and improve counter-WMD capabilities
- **Key regional security architectures retain a nuclear component as long as nuclear threats to U.S. forces and allies remain**
 - Retain capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter- and heavy bombers
 - Proceed with full scope life extension of B61 bomb
 - Retire nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N)
- **Continue close consultations with allies and partners to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent**

Sustaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Arsenal

- **U.S. stockpile management principles:**
 - No nuclear testing – pursue ratification of CTBT
 - No new nuclear warheads: Life Extension Programs (LEPs) will only use previously tested designs and not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities
 - Study warhead sustainment options on case-by-case basis, considering all LEP approaches
 - Strong preference for refurbishment or re-use; replacement of nuclear components would require special Presidential authorization
- **Increase investments in the nuclear weapons complex**
 - Address aging infrastructure
 - Support Science, Technology, and Engineering
 - Recruit and retain key human capital in DoD and DoE
 - Continued leadership focus on the nuclear mission

Looking Ahead: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons

- Continue focus on preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism
- Strengthen regional security architectures while placing increased reliance on non-nuclear deterrence capabilities
- Engage Russia, after ratification and entry into force of New START, in negotiations aimed at achieving substantial further nuclear force reductions
- Following further reductions with Russia, engage other nuclear weapons states, over time, in a multilateral effort to limit, reduce, and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide
- Continue to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist